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Abstract
This work analyzes a managerial delegation model in which ﬁrms that
produce a diﬀerentiated good can choose between two production tech-
nologies: a low marginal cost technology and a high marginal cost tech-
nology. For the former to be adopted more investment is needed than for
the later. By giving managers of ﬁrms an incentive scheme based on a
linear combination of proﬁt and sales revenue, we ﬁnd that Bertrand com-
petition provides a stronger incentive to adopt the cost-saving technology
than the strict proﬁt maximization case. However, the results may be
reversed under Cournot competition. We show that if the degree of prod-
uct substitutability is suﬃciently low (high), the incentive to adopt the
cost-saving technology is larger under strict proﬁt maximization (strategic
delegation).
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This work examines the incentives to acquire cost-saving production technolo-
gies in a managerial delegation model. We ﬁnd this analysis quite relevant since,
although it is generally argued that a study of a ﬁrm’s objective function should
take into account the owner-manager relationship, most works on oligopolis-
tic interaction take up the question of technology choice by treating ﬁrms as
economic agents with the sole objective of proﬁt maximization (see Bester and
Petrakis (1993), Röller and Tombak (1990)).1
In this work we analyze an oligopolistic industry consisting of two ﬁrms that
produce a diﬀerentiated good under both Bertrand and Cournot competition.
The type of production technology choice we describe in this work can be illus-
trated by using the British steam generating industry as an example (see Wield
(1985)). Given the large decline in the home market, in an attempt to make the
ﬁrm internationally competitive Babcock Power Ltd designed a cost-reduction
program in 1980 to cut costs by 25 per cent. The implementation of this pro-
gram needed a £20 million investment: £8 million on plant, £8 million on a new
building and £4 million on other facilities. We set our model in this context.
We assume that ﬁrms invest in the modernization of machinery, manufacturing
and assembly facilities (i.e. ﬁrms invest in the setting up of a new production
plant) which reduce their manufacturing unit costs. Since we do not consider
the licensing of production technologies, the investment needed to implement a
new technology is assumed to be exogenous.
The literature on strategic delegation, which started with Vickers (1985),
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987), examines the incentive con-
tracts that owners of competing ﬁrms give their managers and how these in-
centive contracts can aﬀect the oligopoly outcome. These works show that
proﬁt-maximizing owners will turn their managers away from strict proﬁtm a x -
imization for strategic reasons. In this work we study how strategic delegation
contracts aﬀect ﬁrms’ technology choices in a diﬀerentiated industry. Like Fer-
shtman and Judd (1987), we assume that ﬁrms’ managers will be given an
incentive to maximize an objective function consisting of a linear combination
of proﬁts and sales revenue.
Bester and Petrakis (1993) analyze ﬁrms’ technology choices in a diﬀeren-
tiated industry when ﬁrms’ objective is to maximize strict proﬁts. They focus
on the choice between two types of production technology: a low marginal cost
technology and a high marginal cost technology. For the former to be adopted
more investment is needed than for the later. In this framework, the gains from
a low-marginal-cost technology over a high-marginal-cost technology depend on
how the following variables are aﬀected: (I) the diﬀerence between price and
unit cost of production (i.e. the net price), (II) the output level and (III)
the investment needed to adopt the cost-saving technology relative to the high
marginal cost technology (denoted by F). Under both price and quantity com-
1Nett (1994) moves away from strict proﬁt maximization. He studies the reasons for
diﬀerent production costs between public and private ﬁrms in the context of a mixed duopoly.
2petition, the cost-saving technology leads to higher prices and output. Thus,
for both price and quantity competitions we ﬁn dt w oo p p o s i n gf o r c e s .O nt h e
one hand, (I) and (II) lead to a positive incentive to adopt the low marginal
cost technology. On the other hand, (III) leads to a negative incentive. Thus,
if F is suﬃciently low, (I) and (II) together dominate (III) and, as a result,
both ﬁrms ﬁnd the adoption of the cost-saving technology proﬁtable. For inter-
mediate values of F, the net price increase and the quantity increase induced by
both ﬁrms’ adoption of the low marginal cost technology are not large enough
for (I) and (II) to oﬀset the investment amount. However, the adoption of
this technology by a single ﬁrm induces both a larger net price and a larger
market share for the ﬁrm that adopts the cost-saving technology large enough
for (I) and (II) to oﬀset (III) in that ﬁrm. Finally, if F is suﬃciently high,
(III) dominates (I) and (II) together and, as a result, neither ﬁrm ﬁnds the
adoption of the low marginal cost technology proﬁtable.
Our model takes into account the fact that delegation of production decisions
has strategic eﬀects. We consider an oligopolistic industry consisting of two
ﬁrms that produce a diﬀerentiated good in which owners have to choose the
incentive contracts that are oﬀered to managers. We analyze the implications
of incentive contracts within Bester and Petrakis’s (1993) context. Let us brieﬂy
explain how incentive parameters aﬀect ﬁrms’ technology choice decisions.
It is well known that under price competition, strategic delegation leads
to higher prices than strict proﬁt maximization (see, for example, Fershtman
and Judd (1987)). As a result, positive eﬀect (I) is reinforced. We also show
that positive eﬀect (II) is, in general, weakened. This result is reversed under
quantity competition. We ﬁnd that under price competition, the incentive to
adopt the low marginal cost technology is at least as large when ﬁrms’ owners
delegate price decisions than in the strict proﬁt maximization case. That is,
the reinforcement of eﬀect (I) oﬀsets the weakening of eﬀect (II),w h e r e a s
eﬀect (III) is equal in both cases. However, under quantity competition results
depend on market parameter values. If the degree of product substitutability is
suﬃciently low, we ﬁnd that the incentive to adopt the cost-saving technology is
larger under strict proﬁt maximization than under strategic delegation. In this
case, the weakening of eﬀect (I) provoked by owners’ incentives to managers
is at least as powerful as the reinforcement of eﬀect (II). By contrast, when
products are perceived by consumers as being close substitutes, the incentive
to adopt the cost-saving technology is larger under strategic delegation. In this
case, the weakening of eﬀect (I) provoked by owners’ incentives to managers is
less powerful than the reinforcement of eﬀect (II). We explain this result by
the fact that the larger the degree of product substitutability is, the higher the
market competition is. This eﬀect is reinforced under strategic delegation since
when ﬁrms compete by setting quantities, their owners make their managers
more aggressive than under strict proﬁt maximization, which in turn leads to
greater market competition. Hence the larger incentive to acquire a cost-saving
technology under strategic delegation.
Since we assume that ﬁrms are considering whether to set up a new pro-
duction plant, our approach considers the investment level as exogenously de-
3termined. By contrast, Saracho (2002) assumes that there is an innovator who
sets the price of the innovation. She analyzes the adoption of cost-reducing
innovations in a context of strategic delegation by considering n ﬁrms that pro-
duce a homogeneous good and compete in quantities. Other works study the
inﬂuence of the way in which workers are organized to bargain wages on ﬁrms’
decisions about technology choice (see Tauman and Weiss (1987), Calabuig and
Gonzalez-Maestre (2002)). Bárcena-Ruiz and Olaizola (2004) analyze a manage-
rial delegation model in which ﬁrms can choose between ﬂexible and dedicated
production technologies.
There are works related with our paper which combine the technology choice
literature with the literature on strategic delegation. Lambertini and Primavera
(2001) analyze a model of strategic delegation with cost-reducing R&D. How-
ever, they analize a diﬀerent question that our paper: the relative proﬁtability
of delegation versus process innovation. On the other hand, Zhang and Zhang
(1997) develop a model of strategic delegation with cost-reducing R&D with
the possibility of spillovers across ﬁrms. They assume that the decisions on
R&D correspond to ﬁrms’ managers. They show that if spillovers between ﬁrms
are small (great) enough, then managerial ﬁrms have higher (lower) R&D than
the ﬁrms managed by owners. These works analyze the incentives to acquire
cost-saving production technologies under Cournot behavior with homogeneous
goods. However, we show in our paper that the results we obtain depend on
the degree in which goods are substitutes. Besides, we consider that the owners
arewho decide whether to adopt the cost-saving technology since we assume
that ﬁrms invest in the setting up of a new production plant.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the general
features of a diﬀerentiated duopoly model under strategic delegation. Section
3 analyzes the gains from cost-saving technologies under price competition and
shows how strategic delegation aﬀects ﬁrms’ decisions compared to the strict
proﬁt maximization case. Section 4 takes up the case of quantity competition.
Finally, Section 5 contains some conclusions.
2 The model
We consider a single industry consisting of two ﬁrms that produce a diﬀerenti-
ated good. Before the market opens ﬁrms can choose between two diﬀerent pro-
duction technologies: Technology-l (low-marginal-cost technology), which has
constant marginal cost cl and ﬁxed cost Fl and Technology-h (high-marginal-
cost technology), which has constant marginal cost ch and ﬁxed cost Fh,w i t h
cl <c h and Fl >F h. For the sake of simplicity we normalize Fh to zero and
denote Fl = F.
Each ﬁrm’s owner delegates quantity or price decisions to a manager in order
to improve his strategic position in the market. As in Fershtman and Judd
(1987), we assume that owners oﬀer ‘take it or leave it’ linear incentive schemes
to risk-neutral managers. The manager of ﬁrm i (i =1 ,2) receives a payoﬀ:
βi+BiOi,w h e r eβi and Bi are constant, Bi > 0,a n dOi is a linear combination
4of proﬁts and sales revenue. The owner selects βi and Bi so that the manager
only gets his opportunity cost, which is normalized to zero. Formally, ﬁrm i’s
manager will be given an incentive to maximize:
Oi = αiΠi +( 1− αi)Si, (1)
where
Πi =( pi − ci)qi − Fi and Si = piqi, (2)
represent ﬁrm i’s proﬁt and sales revenue, respectively and αi is the incentive
parameter chosen by ﬁrm i’s owner. We make no restrictions on αi. From (1)
and (2) we obtain:
Oi =( pi − ciαi)qi − αiFi; i,j =1 ,2; i 6= j. (3)
As (3) shows, ﬁrm i’s manager considers αici as the marginal cost of pro-
duction when taking price or quantity decisions. In this way, ﬁrm i’s owner
can make his manager more (less) aggressive, i.e. he can make his manager to
produce a higher (lower) output level than a proﬁt maximizer ﬁrm by choosing
an incentive parameter such that the marginal cost of production considered by
the manager is lower (higher) than that considered by a proﬁt maximizer ﬁrm.
In order to study ﬁrms’ technology choice when there is strategic delegation,
we consider a three stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms’ owners simultaneously
choose the production technology. In the second stage, ﬁrms’ owners simultane-
ously determine the incentive structure for their managers. Finally, in the third
stage, managers play an oligopoly game, with each ﬁrm’s manager knowing his
incentive contract, the incentive contract of the competing manager and the na-
ture of demand and costs. We assume the timing of the above decisions based
on the fact that the production technology choice is a more long-term decision
than the setting of managers’ incentives.
The state of the game in the ﬁrst stage is summarized in Figure 1. We solve







Π(ll), Π(ll) Π(lh), Π(hl)
Π(hl), Π(lh) Π(hh), Π(hh)
Figure 1. Summary of the game
In Figure 1, Π(ll) denotes the proﬁto faﬁrm that adopts Technology-l
when both ﬁrms adopt this technology. Π(hh) denotes the proﬁto faﬁrm that
adopts Technology-h when both ﬁrms adopt this technology. When only one
ﬁrm adopts the cost-saving technology, Π(lh) denotes the proﬁto ft h eﬁrm
that adopts Technology-l and Π(hl) denotes the proﬁto ft h eﬁrm that adopts
Technology-h.I faﬁrm is indiﬀerent between the two technologies, we assume
that it chooses the cost-saving technology.
5To determine whether the results are robust to changes in the type of com-
petition in which ﬁrms are involved, we determine the equilibria in diﬀerent
contexts.
3 Bertrand competition
We ﬁrst study the Bertrand equilibrium in which ﬁrms compete by setting prices.
The demand functions of both goods are assumed to be linear:
qi = a − pi + bpj; a>a ;0 <b<1; i,j =1 ,2; i 6= j,
where pi and qi are the price and the quantity of good i produced by ﬁrm i,
respectively.2
To show how strategic delegation aﬀects ﬁrms’ decisions, we consider ﬁrst
t h es i m p l ep r o ﬁt maximization case.
3.1 Benchmark case: Proﬁt-maximizer ﬁrms
In this case we have a two stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms’ owners simul-
taneously choose the production technology. And, in the second stage, owners
set prices.
In stage two, ﬁrm i’s owner chooses pi to maximize Πi taking the competi-
tor’s price, pj,a sﬁxed. This problem leads to the following solution:
b pi =
a(2 + b)+2 ci + bcj
4 − b2 ; i,j =1 ,2; i 6= j. (4)
In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms’ owners simultaneously choose the production tech-
nology. Firms’ proﬁts and prices are given by Table 1.3
It can easily be seen from (4) that b pi decreases with both ﬁrm i’s and ﬁrm
j’s marginal cost reduction. Therefore, the marginal cost reduction on both
ﬁrms induces ﬁrm i to behave more aggressively (i.e. to set a lower price).
As a result, we have p(hh) >p (hl) >p (lh) >p (ll). That is, when both
ﬁrms adopt Technology-l the equilibrium price is lowest, p(ll), while if both
ﬁrms adopt Technology-h the equilibrium price is highest, p(hh).W e o b t a i n
intermediate prices when only one ﬁrm adopts the cost-saving technology, with
the ﬁrm with the lowest marginal cost being the one that chooses the lowest
price, p(hl) >p(lh).T h i se ﬀect is strategically disadvantageous for ﬁrm i.
However, this does not necessarily mean that the adoption of the cost-saving
technology becomes less proﬁtable. In fact, as (2) shows, the gains from a
marginal cost reduction depend on how the following variables are aﬀected: (I)
the diﬀerence between price and marginal cost, i.e. the net price (denoted as p∗),
(II) the output level and (III) the investment needed to acquire the cost-saving
2The assumption a>a , a = (2−b2)ch−bcl
2+b <c h, is necessary to assure that each ﬁrm’s
output will be positive in equilibrium.
3All tables are relegated to the appendix.





q (lh) >q(ll) >q(hh) >q(hl). Consequently, when analyzing the technology
choice under price competition, we ﬁnd two opposing forces: on the one hand,
(I) and (II) lead to a positive incentive to adopt Technology-l, a n do nt h eo t h e r
hand (III) leads to a negative incentive. Solving the ﬁrst stage of the game we















2 are the investment levels such that Π(lh)=Π(hh) and
Π(hl)=Π(ll), respectively.
Lemma 1 When ﬁrms owners do not delegate price decisions, in equilibrium:
i) Both ﬁrms choose the low-marginal-cost technology if F ≤ F
p
2 .
ii) Both ﬁrms choose the high-marginal-cost technology if F>F
p
1 .





If the adoption of Technology-l does not require any investment F,t h e n
Π(lh) > Π(ll) > Π(hh) > Π(hl).T h i sr e ﬂects the positive incentive to adopt
Technology-l caused by both (I) and (II). This incentive is larger if the other
ﬁrm does not adopt this technology. But since in our model the adoption of
Technology-l requires an investment, diﬀerent investment levels will produce
diﬀerent results in equilibrium. In fact, if F is suﬃciently low (F ≤ F
p
2 ), (I)
and (II) together dominate (III) and, as a result, both ﬁrms ﬁnd the adoption





one ﬁrm adopts Technology-l. The net price increase and the quantity increase
induced by both ﬁrms’ adoption of Technology-l are not large enough for (I) and
(II) to oﬀset the investment amount. However, the adoption of Technology-l
by a single ﬁrm induces a larger net price and a larger market share for the
ﬁrm that adopts this technology, at the expense of the other ﬁrm’s net price
and market share, which is large enough for (I) and (II) to oﬀset (III) in the
ﬁrm that adopts Technology-l. Finally, if F is suﬃciently high (F ≥ F
p
1 ), (III)
dominates (I) and (II) together and, as a result, neither ﬁrm ﬁnds the adoption
of Technology-l proﬁtable.
3.2 Equilibrium under strategic delegation
When ﬁrms’ owners hire managers to take price decisions, we have a three
stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, owners simultaneously choose the production
technology. In the second stage, owners simultaneously determine the incentive
structure for their managers. Finally, in the third stage, managers take price
decisions. The objective function of ﬁrm i’s manager can be written as:
Oi =( pi − ciαi)(a − pi + bpj) − αiFi; i,j =1 ,2; i 6= j.
4The same result is given by Proposition 1 in Bester and Petrakis (1993).
7In stage three, ﬁrm i’s manager chooses pi to maximize Oi taking the com-
petitor’s price, pj, as ﬁxed. The reaction functions derived from the above
maximization problem are:
pi =
a + bpj + ciαi
2
; i,j =1 ,2; i 6= j.
Which can be solved for the equilibrium prices:
b pi =
a(2 + b)+2 ciαi + bcjαj
4 − b2 ; i,j =1 ,2; i 6= j. (5)
In the second stage, ﬁrm i’s owner chooses the incentive parameter of his
manager, αi, that maximizes his ﬁrm’s proﬁt, taking the competitor’s incentive




(16−12b2+b4)ci ; i,j =1 ,2; i 6= j.
We can check that b αi decreases with ci (∂b αi/∂ci < 0) and increases with cj
(∂b αi/∂cj > 0). Therefore, a marginal cost reduction in ﬁrm i (j) induces ﬁrm i
to behave less (more) aggressively. Moreover, as |∂b αi/∂ci| > |∂b αi/∂cj|,ar e d u c -
tion in both ﬁrms’ marginal cost makes ﬁrm i’s manager less aggressive. Conse-
quently, α(lh) >α(ll) >α(hh) >α(hl). If only one ﬁrm adopts Technology-l
the equilibrium incentive is greater, α(lh),f o rt h eﬁrm that adopts Technology-l
and smaller, α(hl),f o rt h eﬁrm that adopts Technology-h. While we obtain in-
termediate values for the incentive parameter if both ﬁrms adopt Technology-h
or neither ﬁrm adopts it, α(hh) and α(ll) respectively, with α(ll) >α (hh).
Note that b αi > 1. Then, ﬁrm i’s manager considers a higher marginal cost of
production than that considered by a proﬁt-maximizer ﬁrm. Therefore, ﬁrm i’s
owner makes his manager less aggressive (i.e. he makes his manager set a larger
price) than a proﬁt-maximizer ﬁrm.
It is straightforward from (5) that b pi increases with both αi and αj.A s a
r e s u l t ,w eh a v et h a tp(hh)d >p (hl)d >p (lh)d >p (ll)d and therefore there
exists a negative strategic incentive to adopt Technology-l. Although strategic
delegation leads to equilibrium prices which are higher than those correspond-
i n gt ot h es t r i c tp r o ﬁt maximization case: p(hh)d >p (hh),p (hl)d >p (hl),
p(lh)d >p(lh) and p(ll)d >p(ll).
As (2) shows, the gains from a marginal cost reduction depend on how the
following variables are aﬀected: (I) the net price (denoted as p∗
d), (II) the output









d and q (lh)d >q(ll)d >q(hh)d >q(hl)d . Consequently, when
analyzing the incentives for the adoption of cost-saving technologies, we ﬁnd two
opposing forces: on the one hand, (I) and (II) lead to a positive incentive to
adopt Technology-l and, on the other hand, (III) leads to a negative incentive.
To study which eﬀect dominates, we solve the ﬁrst stage of the game in which
ﬁrms’ owners simultaneously choose the production technology. Firms’ proﬁts,
8prices and incentive parameters are given by Table 2. The ﬁrst stage of the




















2d are the investment levels such that Π(lh)=Π(hh) and
Π(hl)=Π(ll), respectively.
Lemma 2 When ﬁrms’ owners delegate price decisions, in equilibrium:
i) Both ﬁrms choose the low-marginal-cost technology if F ≤ F
p
2d.
ii) Both ﬁrms choose the high-marginal-cost technology if F>F
p
1d.





If the adoption of Technology-l does not require any investment F,t h e n
Π(lh) > Π(ll) > Π(hh) > Π(hl).T h i sr e ﬂects the positive incentive to adopt
this technology caused by both (I) and (II). But since in our model the adoption
of Technology-l requires an investment, diﬀerent investment levels will produce
diﬀerent results in equilibrium. In fact, if F is suﬃciently low (F ≤ F
p
2d), (I)
and (II) together dominate (III) and, as a result, both ﬁrms ﬁnd the adoption
of Technology-l proﬁt a b l e . T h es a m ea r g u m e n tu s e di nL e m m a1j u s t i ﬁes the




1d) only one ﬁrm adopts
Technology-l. Finally, if F is suﬃciently high (F ≥ F
p
1d), (III) dominates (I)
and (II) together and, as a result, neither ﬁrm ﬁnds the adoption of Technology-
l proﬁtable.
3.3 Results
To show how strategic delegation aﬀects ﬁrms’ decisions about technology choice,
we compare the results obtained under strict proﬁt maximization and strategic
delegation.





2d. Comparing Lemmas 1 and 2 we can see the following:


























Thus, from Lemmas 1 to 3 we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 Under price competition, the incentive to adopt the cost-saving
technology is at least as great when ﬁrms’ owners delegate price decisions as in
the strict proﬁt maximization case.
The result obtained in Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figures 2a and 2b.M o r e
adoption of Technology-l is attained under strategic delegation than under strict


















2d, both ﬁrms adopt Technology-l under strategic delegation while
neither ﬁrm adopts it under strict proﬁt maximization. In all other cases, one
ﬁrm adopts Technology-l under strategic delegation while neither ﬁrm adopts it
under strict proﬁt maximization.
[INSERT FIGURES 2a AND 2b AROUND HERE]
The maximum investment level for which both ﬁrms adopt Technology-l










2 . As a result, the range of values of parameter F for which (ll)
is an equilibrium is larger under strategic delegation than under strict proﬁt
maximization. Moreover, the larger the market size, the larger this diﬀerence.
On the other hand, the minimum investment level for which both ﬁrms adopt




1. And the larger




1 .A sar e s u l t ,t h e
range of values of parameter F for which (hh) is an equilibrium is smaller
under strategic delegation than under strict proﬁt maximization. Moreover,









2d. Therefore, the range of values of F for which (hl) is an
equilibrium is smaller under strategic delegation. However, for the values of F
for which only one ﬁrm adopts Technology-l under strict proﬁt maximization,
at least one ﬁrm adopts this technology under strategic delegation. Hence, we
conclude that the incentive to adopt the cost-saving technology under strategic
delegation is at least as great as under strict proﬁt maximization.
We ﬁnd various reasons for the preceding results. On the one hand, under
price competition, strategic delegation leads to higher prices than strict proﬁt
maximization. As a result, when owners delegate price decisions, the positive
eﬀect (I) is reinforced. On the other hand, it can be see that q(hl)d <q(hl)
for a market size, a suﬃciently large5 while q (hh)d <q (hh),q (ll)d <q (ll)
and q (lh)d <q(lh) for all a. As a result, when owners delegate price decisions,
the positive eﬀect (II) is in general weakened. However, the reinforcement
of eﬀect (I) is at least as powerful as the weakening of eﬀect (II). Hence,
as Π(hh)d > Π(hh), Π(hl)d > Π(hl), Π(lh)d > Π(lh) and Π(ll)d > Π(ll)
and as the negative eﬀect (III) is equal in both cases, the incentive to adopt
Technology-l is at least as large when ﬁrms’ owners delegate price decisions as
in the strict proﬁt maximization case.
4 Cournot competition
We next consider the Cournot equilibrium in which ﬁrms compete by setting
quantities. The inverse demand functions of both goods are assumed to be





pi = a − qi − bqj; a>a;0 <b<1; i,j =1 ,2; i 6= j,
where pi and qi are the price and the quantity of good i produced by ﬁrm i,
respectively.6
To show how strategic delegation aﬀects ﬁrms’ decisions, we ﬁrst consider
t h es i m p l ep r o ﬁt maximization case.
4.1 Benchmark case: Proﬁt-maximizer ﬁrms
In stage two, ﬁrm i’s owner chooses qi to maximize Πi taking the competitor’s
quantity, qj, as ﬁxed. This problem leads to the following solution:
b qi =
a(2 − b) − 2ci + bcj
4 − b2 ; i,j =1 ,2; i 6= j. (6)
In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms’ owners simultaneously choose the production tech-
nology. Firms’ proﬁts and quantities are given by Table 3.
We can see from (6) that b qi decreases with ci and increases with cj.T h e r e -
fore, a marginal cost reduction in ﬁrm i (j) induces ﬁrm i to behave more (less)
aggressively, i.e. to produce a larger (smaller) quantity. Moreover, as |∂b qi/∂ci| >
|∂b qi/∂cj|, ﬁrm i’s output changes more with its own marginal cost than with that
of the competing ﬁrm. As a result, we have that q (lh) >q(ll) >q(hh) >q(hl).
The highest output level, q (lh), corresponds to a ﬁrm that adopts Technology-l
when the other ﬁrm adopts Technology-h, while the lowest output level, q (hl),
corresponds to a ﬁrm that adopts Technology-h when the other ﬁrm adopts
Technology-l. Then, ﬁrm i’s marginal cost reduction is strategically advan-
tageous for ﬁrm i and quantity competition thus creates a positive strategic
incentive to adopt the cost-saving technology.
However, this does not necessarily mean that the adoption of Technology-
l becomes proﬁtable. In fact, as (2) shows, the gains from a marginal cost
reduction depend on how the following variables are aﬀected: (I) the net price
(denoted as p∗), (II) the output level and (III) the investment level. We




∗ and q (lh) >q (ll) >
q (hh) >q(hl). Consequently, (I) and (II) lead to a positive incentive to adopt
Technology-l and, on the other hand, (III) leads to a negative incentive. Solving














2 are the investment levels such that Π(lh)=Π(hh) and
Π(hl)=Π(ll), respectively.
6The assumption a>a, a = (4−b2)ch−2bcl
4−2b−b2 >c h, is necessary to assure that each ﬁrm’s
output will be positive in equilibrium.
7The same result is given by Proposition 1 in Bester and Petrakis (1993).
11Lemma 4 When ﬁrms owners do not delegate production decisions, in equilib-
rium:
i) Both ﬁrms choose the low-marginal-cost technology if F ≤ F
q
2.
ii) Both ﬁrms choose the high-marginal-cost technology if F>F
q
1.





If the adoption of Technology-l does not require any investment F,t h e n
Π(lh) > Π(ll) > Π(hh) > Π(hl).T h i sr e ﬂects the positive incentive to adopt
Technology-l caused by both (I) and (II). But since in our model the adoption
of Technology-l requires an investment, diﬀerent investment levels will produce
diﬀerent results in equilibrium. In fact, if F is suﬃciently low (F ≤ F
q
2), (I)
and (II) together dominate (III) and, as a result, both ﬁrms ﬁnd the adoption





adoption of the cost-saving technology by a single ﬁrm induces a higher net
price and a larger market share for the ﬁrm that adopts this technology, at the
expense of the other ﬁrm’s net price and market share, which is large enough for
(I) and (II) to oﬀset (III) in the ﬁrm that adopts Technology-l.A sar e s u l t ,
only one ﬁrm adopts the cost-saving technology. Finally, if F is suﬃciently high
(F ≥ F
q
1), (III) dominates (I) and (II) together and, as a result, neither ﬁrm
ﬁnds the adoption of Technology-l proﬁtable.
4.2 Equilibrium under strategic delegation
The objective function of ﬁrm i’s manager can be written as:
Oi =( a − qi − bqj − ciαi)qi − αiFi; i,j =1 ,2; i 6= j.
In stage three, ﬁrm i’s manager chooses qi to maximize Oi taking the com-
petitor’s output, qj, as ﬁxed. The reaction functions derived from the above
maximization problem are:
qi =
a − bqj − ciαi
2
; i,j =1 ,2; i 6= j.
Which can be solved for the equilibrium quantities:
b qi =
a(2 − b) − 2ciαi + bcjαj
4 − b2 ; i,j =1 ,2; i 6= j. (7)
In the second stage, ﬁrm i’ owner chooses the incentive parameter of his
manager, αi, that maximizes his ﬁrm’s proﬁt, taking the competitor’s incentive




(16−12b2+b4)ci ; i,j =1 ,2; i 6= j.
12We can check that b αi increases with ci (∂b αi/∂ci > 0) and decreases with
cj (∂b αi/∂cj < 0),w i t h|∂b αi/∂ci| > |∂b αi/∂cj|. Consequently, α(lh) <α(ll) <
α(hh) <α(hl). If only one ﬁrm adopts Technology-l the equilibrium incentive
is smaller, α(lh),f o rt h eﬁrm that adopts Technology-l and larger, α(hl),f o rt h e
ﬁrm that adopts Technology-h. We obtain intermediate values for the incentive
parameter if neither ﬁrm adopts Technology-l or both ﬁrms adopt it, α(hh)
and α(ll) respectively, with α(ll) <α (hh).N o t e t h a t b αi < 1. Then, ﬁrm
i’s manager considers a lower marginal cost of production than that considered
by a proﬁt-maximizer ﬁrm. Therefore, ﬁrm i’s owner makes his manager more
aggressive (i.e. his manager produces a larger quantity) than a proﬁt-maximizer
ﬁrm.
>From (7) we have that b qi decreases with αi and increases with αj,b e i n g
|∂b qi/∂αi| > |∂b qi/∂αj|.W eh a v ea l s os e e nt h a tα(lh) <α(ll) <α(hh) <α(hl).
As a result, we have that q (lh)d >q (ll)d >q (hh)d >q (hl)d and therefore,
there exists a positive strategic incentive to adopt Technology-l.M o r e o v e r ,
under strategic delegation equilibrium quantities are higher than those under
strict proﬁt maximization: q (hh)d >q(hh),q(hl)d >q(hl),q (lh)d >q(lh)
and q (ll)d >q(ll).
However, as under strict proﬁt maximization, this does not necessarily mean
that the adoption of Technology-l becomes proﬁtable. In fact, as (2) shows, the
gains from a marginal cost reduction depend on how the following variables are
aﬀected: (I) net price (denoted as p∗
d), (II) output level and (III) investment
level. We have already seen that q (lh)d >q(ll)d >q(hh)d >q(hl)d.W ec a n








d . Consequently, when analyzing
ﬁrms’ technology choice, we ﬁnd two opposing forces: on the one hand, (I) and
(II) lead to a positive incentive to adopt Technology-l and on the other hand
(III) leads to a negative incentive. To study which eﬀect dominates, we solve
the ﬁrst stage of the game, in which ﬁrms’ owners simultaneously choose the
production technology. Firms’ proﬁts, prices and incentive parameters are given
















2d are the investment levels such that Π(lh)=Π(hh) and
Π(hl)=Π(ll), respectively.
Lemma 5 When ﬁrms owners delegate production decisions, in equilibrium:
i) Both ﬁrms choose the low-marginal-cost technology if F ≤ F
q
2d.
ii) Both ﬁrms choose the high-marginal-cost technology if F>F
q
1d.





If the adoption of Technology-l does not require any investment F, Π(lh)d >
Π(ll)d > Π(hh)d > Π(hl)d.T h i s r e ﬂects the positive incentive to adopt
Technology-l caused by both (I) and (II). But since in our model the adop-
tion of the cost-saving technology requires an investment, diﬀerent investment
13levels will produce diﬀerent results in equilibrium. In fact, if F is suﬃciently
low (F ≤ F
q
2d), (I) and (II) together dominate (III) and, as a result, both
ﬁrms ﬁnd the adoption of Technology-l proﬁtable. The same argument used in





only one ﬁrm adopts Technology-l. Finally, if F is suﬃciently high (F ≥ F
q
1d),
(III) dominates (I) and (II) together and, as a result, neither ﬁrm ﬁnds the
adoption of Technology-l proﬁtable.
4.3 Results
Now we compare the results obtained under strict proﬁt maximization and
strategic delegation.
Let b =0 .8466 and a1,a 2,a 3 and a4 deﬁn e di nT a b l e5 ,w i t hb being the value


























2d, respectively. Comparing Lemmas 4 and 5 we obtain
the following result, which is illustrated by Figures 3a and 3b.




























































2d when a ≤ a3.
Thus, from Lemmas 4 to 6 we can verify the following result.
Proposition 2 Under quantity competition, the incentive to adopt the cost-
saving technology is at least as large when ﬁrms’ owners delegate production










2. In all other cases the incentive to adopt the cost-saving technology is strictly
smaller when ﬁrms owners delegate production decisions than under strict proﬁt
maximization.
The result obtained in Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figures 3a and 3b.
[INSERT FIGURES 3a and 3b AROUND HERE]
We ﬁnd a number of reasons for the result obtained in Proposition 2. On the
one hand, strategic delegation leads to lower prices than strict proﬁt maximiza-
tion. As a result, when owners delegate quantity decisions, positive eﬀect (I) is
weakened. On the other hand, it can be demonstrated that q(hl)d >q(hl) for
a market size, a, suﬃciently large8 while q (hh)d >q(hh),q(ll)d >q(ll) and
q (lh)d >q (lh) for all a. Consequently, when owners delegate quantity deci-
sions, positive eﬀect (II) is, in general, reinforced. However, depending on the
8q (hl)d >q(hl) if and only if a>a ∗∗,w h e r ea∗∗ =
8ch−b(8−b2)cl
8−8b+b3 > a.
14parameter values, the weakening of eﬀect (I) may be more/less powerful than
the reinforcement of eﬀect (II).I tc a nb es h o w nt h a t∂F
q





i /∂a∂b < 0 and ∂2F
q





increase with a. However, the larger the degree of product substitutability, the




id). We can explain this
result by the fact that the larger the degree of product substitutability is (i.e.
the larger the value of parameter b), the higher the market competition will be.
Consequently, for a given value of parameter a, the larger the value of parameter
b, the smaller the ﬁrms’ proﬁts. This last eﬀect is reinforced under strategic del-
egation: under quantity competition ﬁrms’ owners make their managers more
aggressive than under strict proﬁt maximization, which in turn leads to a higher
level of market competition. As a result, when products are highly diﬀerentiated
(b<b), then ∂F
q
i /∂a > ∂F
q
id/∂a for i =1 ,2. By contrast, when products are
close substitutes (b>b)w eh a v et h a t∂F
q
i /∂a < ∂F
q
id/∂a for i =1 ,2. This is




id in Figures 3a and 3b. Let us
analyze these results in more detail.





2d for all a. As a result, the range of values of F and a for which both
ﬁrms adopt Technology-l is larger under strict proﬁt maximization than that





if and only if a>a 1. Consequently, for a suﬃciently large market size, the range
of values of F and a for which neither ﬁrm adopts Technology-l is smaller under
strict proﬁt maximization. The opposing result is obtained for a<a 1. However,
as Figure 3a shows, the area for which both ﬁrms adopt Technology-h is larger








2, the range of
values of F and a for which only one ﬁrm adopts Technology-l is larger under
strategic delegation. Lastly, the only range of values for which more adoption
of Technology-l is attained under strategic delegation than under strict proﬁt




1d (under strategic delegation
one ﬁrm adopts Technology-l while under strict proﬁt maximization both ﬁrms
adopt Technology-h). However, as ﬁgure 3a shows, this last area is smaller
than the sum of areas in which more adoption of Technology-l is attained under
strict proﬁt maximization. As a result, we can conclude that when the degree of
product substitutability is suﬃciently low the incentive to adopt the cost-saving
technology is at least as large when ﬁrms owners do not delegate production
d e c i s i o n sa sw h e nt h e yd o .





1 for all a. As a result, the range of values of F and a for which
neither ﬁrm adopts Technology-l is larger under strict proﬁt maximization than





2 if and only if a>a 3. Consequently, for a suﬃciently large market size, the
range of values of F and a for which both ﬁrms adopt Technology-l is larger
under strategic delegation. The opposing result is obtained for a<a 3. However,
as Figure 3b shows, the area for which both ﬁrms adopt Technology-l is larger








2, the range of
values of F and a for which only one ﬁrm adopts Technology-l is larger under
15strategic delegation. Lastly, the only range of values for which Technology-l is
attained less under strategic delegation than under strict proﬁt maximization




2 (under strategic delegation one ﬁrm
adopts Technology-l while under strict proﬁt maximization both ﬁrms adopt
Technology-l). However, as ﬁgure 3b shows, this last area is smaller than the
sum of areas in which Technology-l is attained more under strategic delegation.
As a result we can conclude that when the degree of product substitutabil-
ity is suﬃciently high, the incentive to adopt the cost-saving technology is at
least as large when ﬁrms owners delegate production decisions as in strict proﬁt
maximization.


















2, the incentive to adopt Technology-l is larger under strict proﬁt
maximization.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This work analyzes how strategic incentives may play a fundamental role in
ﬁrms’ decisions to adopt cost-saving technologies in a context of duopolistic
competition. The results suggest that it may be important to take into ac-
count the incentive scheme that proﬁt-maximizing owners design for their man-
agers. These incentives imply that managers’ objective functions diﬀer from
strict proﬁt maximization.
We identify three diﬀerent eﬀects that determine the eﬀectiveness of a cost-
saving technology adoption. First, equilibrium net prices increase when ﬁrms’
production marginal costs are lower. Second, equilibrium outputs increase when
ﬁrms’ production marginal costs are lower. We ﬁnd that these two eﬀects lead to
a positive incentive to adopt the cost-saving technology. Third, the investment
needed to acquire a low marginal cost technology is larger than for a high-
marginal-cost technology. This last eﬀect weakens the incentive to adopt the
cost-saving technology.
In this work we determine conditions under which ﬁrms are more inclined
to adopt cost-saving technologies and ﬁnd that these conditions depend on the
type of market competition in which ﬁrms are involved. Comparing the results
obtained under strict proﬁt maximization and strategic delegation yields to
the following. Under price competition, the incentive to adopt the cost-saving
technology is at least as large when ﬁrms owners delegate price decisions as in
t h ec a s eo fs t r i c tp r o ﬁt maximization. However, under quantity competition
the results depend on the values of the market parameters. More precisely,
the degree of product substitutability plays an important role in this result. We
show that if the degree of product substitutability is suﬃciently low the incentive
to adopt the cost-saving technology is larger under strict proﬁt maximization
than under strategic delegation. By contrast, when products are perceived by
consumers as being close substitutes, the incentive to adopt the cost-saving
technology is larger under strategic delegation.

























































Price competition under strategic delegationΠ q
ll
(a−cl)2
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